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Abstract. In this paper we will study an important but rather tech-
nical result which is called The Reduction Property. The result tells us
how much arithmetical conservation there is between two arithmetical
theories. Both theories essentially speak about the fundamental principle
of reflection: if a sentence is provable then it is true. The first theory is
axiomatized using reflection axioms and the second theory uses reflection
rules. The Reduction Property tells us that the first theory extends the
second but in a conservative way for a large class of formulae.
We extend the Reduction Property in various directions. Most notably,
we shall see how various different kind of reflection axioms and rules
can be related to each other. Further, we extend the Reduction Property
to transfinite reflection principles. Since there is no satisfactory (hyper)
arithmetical interpretation around yet, this generalization shall hence be
performed in a purely algebraic setting.
For the experts: a consequence of the classical Reduction Property char-
acterizes the Π0n+1 consequences and tells us that for any theories U and
T of the right complexity we have
U + Conn+1(T ) ≡Π0
n+1
U ∪ {Conkn(T ) | k < ω}.
We will compute which theories can be put at the right-hand side if we
are interested in Π0j formulas with j≤n. We answer the question also in a
purely algebraic setting where Π0j -conservation will be suitably defined.
The algebraic turn allows for generalizations to transfinite consistency
notions.
1 Introduction
Go¨del’s celebrated second incompleteness theorem roughly states that any rea-
sonable theory will not prove its own consistency. A theory T is called consistent
if no contradiction can be proven. We shall consider theories that contain a min-
imal amount of arithmetic where consistency is thus equivalent to stating that
0 = 1 cannot be proven.
We can represent syntactical objects such as proofs by numbers, just as a
text file will be represented by a binary number inside a computer. The numbers
representing syntax in arithmetic are called Go¨del numbers. Simple operations
on syntax like substitution correspond to easy arithmetical operations on the
corresponding Go¨del numbers. In this vein, a theory T with an easy axiom set
allows for an arithmetical formula AxiomT (x) that represents this axiom set in
the sense that
N |= AxiomT (x) ⇐⇒ x is the Go¨del number of an axiom of T . (1)
Using this AxiomT (x) formula one can, as Go¨del did in his seminal paper [?],
write a provability predicate T for the theory T so that
N |= T (x) ⇐⇒ x is the Go¨del number of a formula that has a proof in T .
For the sake of readability we shall refrain from differentiating between a syn-
tactical object like a formula ϕ and its Go¨del number as the context should
always make clear which is meant where. With this reading convention and a
provability predicate as above we can now write Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem succinctly as T 0 ¬T 0 = 1, or, equivalently as:
T 0 T 0 = 1→ 0 = 1. (2)
This formulation of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem readily suggests a
general format and strengthening which is called reflection: that what is prov-
able, is actually true. In symbols, Tϕ→ ϕ.
Philosophically speaking, reflection is an interesting principle. It seems that
if one commits to the axioms of a theory T , one should also commit to reflection
over T , yet reflection itself does not follow from the axioms of T as (2) showed
us. As such, and due to the many applications that we shall see, reflection is a
fundamental concept in mathematical logic and in the study on the foundations
of mathematics.
In this paper, we shall study certain aspects of reflection. In particular, we
will study a relation between reflection formulated as an axiom on the one hand
and reflection formulated as a rule on the other hand. To formulate the exact
statement of our study and provide it with due motivation we first need some
definitions and notation.
Namely, for various reasons it turns out to be natural, important and useful to
restrict the formulas ϕ that occur in the reflection principle Tϕ→ ϕ to certain
natural formula classes. Thus we should first say some words on our syntax. For
the sake of the paper being self-contained we shall outline the syntactical notions
and refer the reader to any standard work (e.g. [7]) on the topic for the details.
In this paper we will only consider theories in the language of arithmetic,
although all results can be generalized to a broader setting. Thus, our language
will consist of the usual arithmetic constants 0 and 1, operations +, · and 2x for
addition, multiplication and exponentiation and, the binary relation ≤. Terms
are defined as usual using these symbols. We call a formula bounded if any
quantified variable x is bounded by some term t that does not contain x. Thus,
we only allow quantifiers of the form ∀x≤t or ∃x≤t. The set of all bounded
formula is denoted by ∆0. We inductively define Π0 := Σ0 := ∆0 and Πn+1 :=
{∀x0, . . . , xm ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σn} and likewise Σn+1 := {∃x0, . . . , xm ϕ | ϕ ∈ Πn}.
Tarski proved that there is no arithmetical formula True(x) that is true in
the standard model of arithmetic of exactly the Go¨del numbers of formulas that
are true in the standard model of arithmetic. However, it is well-known that
partial truth predicates do exist. For example, we have a predicate TrueΠn(x)
so that for every formula π in Πn we have N |= TrueΠn(π) ↔ π. For all of
the above formula classes, such a partial truth predicate exists and we shall use
them freely throughout the paper. Further good properties of the partial truth-
predicates are that the equivalence is actually provable in EA. Moreover, the
complexity of truth predicates are as high as the formula class it speaks about.
Thus, for example, TrueΠn is of complexity Πn.
The theory EA of Elementary Arithmetic is given by the defining axioms for
the arithmetical symbols together with the induction formulas
Iϕ := ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1)
)
−→ ∀x ϕ(x)
for each bounded formula ϕ. An arbitrary theory T shall be called elementary
representable whenever its axiom-set can be defined by a ∆0 formula in the sense
of (1). For example, EA is elementary representable.
For a natural number n we denote by n its numeral which is a term that
evaluates to n. It is standard to take n := 0 +
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 + . . .+ 1. By Tϕ(x˙) we shall
denote a predicate with free variable x that for each number x states the prov-
ability in T of the formula ϕ(x). We are now ready to formulate the central
notion of this paper.
Definition 1. Given an elementary presentable theory T, and for n a natural
number, the uniform reflection principle RFNΣn(T) is the set of sentences
∀x
(
Tϕ(x˙)→ ϕ(x)
)
for all ϕ(x) ∈ Σn.
The principle RFNΠn(T) is defined similarly. For various reasons the partial
reflection principles are natural and interesting. For one, it is easy to see that they
lead to ever increasing independent principles: stronger and stronger versions of
the second incompleteness theorem so to say.
As a matter of fact, it turns out that each of the partial reflection principles
is equivalent to ever stronger consistency notions. To make this precise, let us
introduce the following definition where we abbreviate ¬T¬ϕ by ♦Tϕ.
Definition 2. A theory T is called n-consistent if T together with all true arith-
metical formulas of complexity Πn is consistent, that is, if ∀x
(
TrueΠn(x) →
♦TrueΠn(x˙)
)
holds. We abbreviate this formula by 〈n〉T⊤.
One can easily see that the partial reflection schema is finitely axiomatizable
in terms of the partial truth predicate and hence the following holds:
Proposition 1. EA ⊢ T+ RFNΣn(T + ϕ) ≡ T + 〈n〉Tϕ.
Proof. Using the truth predicate the reflection schema RFNΣn+1(T) can be ex-
pressed as the formula ∀x
(
TrueΣn(x˙) → TrueΣn(x)
)
, which is just the con-
traposition of arithmetization of n-consistency. This concludes the proof, since
EA ⊢ 〈n〉Tϕ↔ 〈n〉T+ϕ⊤, by the formalized deduction theorem.
We further mention that reflection principles are related to various other
branches of mathematical logic. For example, it has been proven that the reflec-
tion principle RFNΣn+1(EA) is (provably over some rather weak theory) equiv-
alent to IΣn+1. Here, IΣn+1 is as EA only that we now allow for induction
formulas for any Σn+1 formula. The point that we wish to make here is that
reflection principles are natural and have various applications.
Note that our formulation of reflection is given in terms of axioms. One can
also formulate a rule-based version of reflection. The rule-based version of reflec-
tion has better proof-theoretical and computational properties which motivates
their usage.
In formulating the corresponding reflection rule, one has to be a bit careful.
For example, it is easy to see that the rule Tϕ
ϕ
for ϕ a sentence is simply
admissible as a rule for theories that only prove correct Σ1 sentences. On the
other hand, if we allow parameters, adding to a theory T the rule ∀xTϕ(x˙)∀xϕ(x) turns
out to be equivalent to adding to T the full reflection principle RFN(T) for all
formulas with parameters (see Beklemishev [2], p. 14 for the proof of this fact).
The better behaved reflection rule turns out to be the one that is obtained by
contraposing a certain form of the reflection axiom. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 3. Given an elementary presentable theory T and m,n < ω, the
n-reflection rule over T is:
ϕ
RR
n(T):
〈n〉Tϕ
Then Πm-RR
n(T) is the n-reflection rule with ϕ(x) ∈ Πm.
Although the different versions of this rule look very technical and artifi-
cial, various fragments of arithmetic can naturally be described by them. For
example, it is known that Primitive Recursive Arithmetic is equivalent to EA+
Π2-RR
n(EA). Now that we have given the definition of the reflection rule, we
can finally state the theorem called the Reduction Property which is the main
topic and starting point of this paper. It is easy to see that the reflection axiom is
stronger than the corresponding principle. The reduction property tells us that
it is not too much stronger.
Theorem 1 (Reduction property). Let T be an elementary presented theory
containing EA, and let U be any Πn+2-extension of EA. Then U+RFNΣn+1(T)
is Πn+1-conservative over U+Πn+1-RR
n(T).
Proof. See [2]: use cut-elimination to reduce RFNΣn+1(T) toΠn+1-RR
n(T). (Hence
this fact is provable in EA+. Here EA+ is as EA together with an axiom that
states the totality of the super-exponential function.)
The technicality of the theorem draws away the attention from its strength.
Let us just mention that for n = 1 and T = U = EA, the Reduction Property
gives us that IΣ1 isΠ2 conservative over PRA (Parson’s Theorem). Furthermore,
the Reduction Property is the central ingredient to perform Π1-ordinal analysis
for PA and its kin based on provability logics (see [1]).
In this paper we will do the following. In Section 2 we will revisit some
definitions and results from polymodal provability logic. These logics are used
in Section 3 where we give prove our first variations on the reduction property.
First it is observed that significant simplifications of the reduction property arise
when U = T . Next, over this simplification we prove various generalizations.
Most notably, we shall see how various different kind of reflection axioms and
rules can be related to each other.
In Section 4 we shall also extend the Reduction Property to transfinite reflec-
tion principles. Since there is no satisfactory (hyper) arithmetical interpretation
around yet, this generalization shall hence be performed in a purely algebraic
setting.
2 Polymodal provability logic
Many of our results are stated using formalized provability notions like [n]Tϕ.
The structural behavior of those predicates is described by what is called poly-
modal provability logic. This is a propositional modal logic with for each given
ordinal α a modality [α].
Definition 4. For Λ an ordinal or the class of all ordinals, the logic GLPΛ is
given by the following axioms:
1. all propositional tautologies,
2. Distributivity: [ξ](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([ξ]ϕ→ [ξ]ψ) for all ξ < Λ,
3. Transitivity: [ξ]ϕ→ [ξ][ξ]ϕ for all ξ < Λ,
4. Lo¨b: [ξ]([ξ]ϕ→ ϕ)→ [ξ]ϕ for all ξ < Λ,
5. Negative introspection: 〈ζ〉ϕ→ 〈ξ〉ϕ for ξ < ζ < Λ,
6. Monotonicity: 〈ξ〉ϕ→ [ζ]〈ξ〉ϕ for ξ < ζ < Λ.
The rules are Modes Ponens and Necessitation for each modality:
ϕ
[ξ]ϕ
.
The following proposition is often used without explicit mention throughout
the paper.
Proposition 2. Let Λ be an ordinal, γ > ζ ∈ Λ and ϕ, ψ are GLPΛ formulae,
then:
⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉(ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ)↔ (〈γ〉ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ)
At times we shall write ϕ ⊢GLP ψ instead of ⊢GLP ϕ → ψ and shall drop
subscripts if the context allows us to. When both ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ ϕ we will write
ϕ ≡ ψ. We are interested in a particular subclass of formulae of GLPΛ called
worms. They represent iterated consistency statements.
Definition 5. Given an ordinal Λ, the set of worms W<Λ is inductively defined
as follows:
– ⊤ ∈W;
– 〈γ〉A ∈W<Λ if γ < Λ and A ∈W<Λ.
We write W<Λγ for the collection of worms where all modalities are smaller than
γ. Sometimes we omit Λ when the context permits so.
For A a worm, we denote by α ↑ A the worm that arrises by replacing each
modality 〈ξ〉 by 〈α + ξ〉. Likewise, for A ∈ Wα we denote by α ↓ A the worm
that arrises by replacing each modality 〈ξ〉 by 〈−α+ ξ〉. As usual, for α ≤ ξ the
result of −α + ξ is defined as the unique ordinal such that α + (−α + ξ) = ξ.
Sometimes we will omit the modality brackets when writing worms. For example
we will write ζA instead of 〈ζ〉A.
Worms in Wγ are lineraly ordered (see [4]) using the following relation:
Definition 6. (<,<γ) A <γ B ⇐⇒ B ⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉A. For <0 we write <.
Worms can be mapped to ordinals with the following isomorphism between
〈W/ ≡, <0〉 and 〈Ord, <〉:
1. o(⊤) = 0;
2. o(A) = o(b(A)) + ωo(1↓h(A)) + 1 if A 6= ⊤ and min A = 0;
3. o(A) = eµo(µ ↓ A) if A 6= ⊤ and µ = min A > 0.
Here, eµ denotes a hyperexponential function defined in [6]. Basically, eµ is
‘µ-times iteration’ of the function α 7→ −1 + ωα with e0 being the identity. For
the purpose of this paper it is not really important to know how this iteration
is exactly defined other than eα+β = eα ◦ eβ.
Definition 7 (hα, (oγ)). For any worm A, we define its γ-head denoted by
hγ(A) as follows: hγ(⊤) := ⊤, hγ(ζA) := ζhγ(A) if γ ≤ ζ and hγ(ζA) := ⊤ if
ζ < γ. With this notion of head, we can now define an order function for any
ordinal.
oγ(A) = o(γ ↑ hγ(A)).
The generalized order relation is related to the generalized order function as
expected:
Lemma 1. For A,B ⊆Wγ , oγ(A) < oγ(B) ⇐⇒ A <γ B.
As we shall see, various aspects of the Reduction Property can be formulated
using formalized provability predicates. Since the structural behaviour of those
predicates is given by GLP in a sense specified below, we can use all our GLP
reasoning inside arithmetical arguments.
The relevant link between GLP and arithmetic for this paper is the soundness
theorem. Key to this theorem is the notion of an arithmetical T -realization which
is a map ⋆ : Prop → Form from propositional variables to formulas in the lan-
guage of arithmetic which is extended to range over all modal formulas of GLPω
by stipulating that ⋆ commutes with boolean connectives like (ϕ∧ψ)∗ = ϕ∗∧ψ∗
and moreover, (〈n〉ϕ)∗ := 〈n〉Tϕ
∗.
Theorem 2 (Arithmetical soundness). Given an elementary presented the-
ory T and U any arithmetical theory extending EA, and letting ⋆ range over
arithmetical T -realizations, we have that
GLPω ⊢ ϕ =⇒ ∀ ⋆ U ⊢ ϕ
∗.
3 Variations of the reduction property
In this section we shall give a genuine generalization of the full Reduction Prop-
erty. But we will first see that when taking U = T in the reduction property,
that this allows for substantial simplifications. It is of this simplification that we
shall prove various algebraic generalizations in the next section.
3.1 A simplification and iterated consistency
It is convenient to axiomatize the Reduction property using Beklemishev’s Q-
formulae.
Definition 8 (Iterated n-consistency). Let T be any arithmetic theory con-
taining EA and ϕ be any formula in the language of T. Define:
Q0n(ϕ) = ⊤
Qk+1n (ϕ) = 〈n〉T(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)).
For ϕ = ⊤ these Q formulas just reduce to iterated consistency.
Observation 3 Qkn(⊤)↔ 〈n〉
k
T⊤.
The main ingredients of the following proposition were almost formulated as
such in [8]. The proposition tells us that we can simplify the reduction property
significantly in case T = U .
Proposition 3.
1. T + RRn(T + ϕ) ≡ T+ {Qkn(ϕ) | k < ω}
2. T +Πn+1-RR
n(T + ϕ) ≡ T+ {Qkn(ϕ) | k < ω}
3. T + RRn(T + ϕ) ≡ T+Πn+1-RR
n(T + ϕ).
Proof. (⊇, 1-2) For this direction, Statement 2 implies 1, so it is sufficient to show
that for all k < ω, T +Πn+1-RR
n(T + ϕ) ⊢ Qkn(ϕ). We show this by induction
on k. Obviously, this implies that T + RRn(T + ϕ) ⊢ Qkn(ϕ). For k = 0 this
is trivial. For the inductive case, assume that T +Πn+1-RR
n(T + ϕ) ⊢ Qkn(ϕ).
Since Qkn(ϕ) ∈ Πn+1, by one application of the Πn+1-RR
n(T + ϕ) rule we get
T +Πn+1-RR
n(T + ϕ) ⊢ 〈n〉(ϕ ∧Qkn(ϕ)).
(⊆, 1-2) For this direction, Statement 1 implies 2, so it is sufficient to prove
the first statement. Assume that T+RRn(T+ϕ) ⊢ χ. We show that T+{Qkn(ϕ) |
k < ω} ⊢ χ by induction on l, the number of applications of the RRn(T) rule. For
l = 0, we have that T ⊢ χ and thus T + {Qkn(ϕ) | k < ω} ⊢ χ. Now assume that
T+RRn(T+ϕ) ⊢ χ by l+1 applications of RRn rule and wlog that χ = 〈n〉(ϕ∧χ1)
and T +RRn(T+ϕ) ⊢ χ1. Then by the induction hypothesis, T+Q
k
n(ϕ) ⊢ χ1 for
some k. By the deduction theorem we get T ⊢ Qkn(ϕ)→ χ1 and by necessitation
T ⊢ [n]
(
Qkn(ϕ) → χ1
)
. By definition, T + {Qkn(ϕ) | k < ω} ⊢ 〈n〉
(
ϕ ∧ Qkn(ϕ)
)
and thus T + {Qkn(ϕ) | k < ω} ⊢ 〈n〉(ϕ ∧ χ1).
3. Statement 3 obviously follows from 1 and 2.
Note that here it is essential that we consider the reflection rule on extensions
of T, since the claim doesn’t hold in general. Consider for instance the theory
EA+〈n+1〉T⊤+RRn(EA). It is the consequence of the reduction property that:
Proposition 4. (EA+〈n+1〉EA⊤)+RR
n(EA) 6≡ (EA+〈n+1〉EA⊤)+Πn+1-RR
n(EA).
The proof is in the appendix. The fact that the reflection schema is equivalent
to n-consistency together with the Proposition 3 allows us to reformulate the
reduction property.
Corollary 1 (Arithmetic reduction property). Let T be a Πn+2 extension
of EA and ϕ be any arithmetic formula, then:
EA+ ⊢ T + 〈n+ 1〉Tϕ ≡Π0n+1 T+ {Q
k
n(ϕ) | k < ω}.
3.2 Πj+1-consequences
Now we want to characterize exactly the Πj+1-consequences of n+1 consistency
statements, for any j ≤ n. It is enough to consider only worms due to the
following fact:
Proposition 5. For any r.e. theory T and any formula ϕ,
〈n〉T+ϕ⊤ ≡Πn+1 {〈n〉
k
T+ϕ⊤ | k < ω}
iff
〈n〉Tϕ ≡Πn+1 {Q
k
n(ϕ) | k < ω}.
Proof. By the formalized deduction theorem, EA ⊢ 〈n〉T+ϕ⊤ ↔ 〈n〉Tϕ and then,
by induction on k, EA ⊢ Qkn(ϕ)↔ 〈n〉
k
T+ϕ⊤.
We will now formulate a generalization of the Reduction Property. For this
we need to consider the following rule which is new.
Definition 9. Given an elementary presentable theory T and m,n < ω, the
j-n-reflection rule over T is:
ψ
RRjn(T):
〈j〉T〈n〉Tψ
We can now prove a generalization of the reduction property theorem and
characterize exactly the Πj+1 consequences of 〈n+ 1〉T⊤.
Theorem 4. Let T be an elementary presented theory containing EA, and let
U be any Πn+2-extension of EA. Then U + RFNΣn+1(T) is Πj+1-conservative
over U+Πj+1-RR
jn(T).
Note that T+RRjn(T+ϕ) ≡ T+ {〈j〉T(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)) | i, k < ω}, thus we get the
characterization of Πj-consequences.
Proposition 6. T+ RRjn(T + ϕ) ≡ T+ {〈j〉T(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)) | i, k < ω}
Proof. The proof of this is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3, since the rule
RRjn(T + ϕ) is equivalent to the rule
ψ
〈j〉T(ϕ ∧ 〈n〉T(ϕ ∧ ψ)).
For the (⊇) direction after applying the j--reflection rule to the I.H. use the
fact that 〈j〉T+ϕ〈n〉T+ϕ〈j〉Q
k
n(ϕ) implies 〈j〉T+ϕ〈n〉T+ϕQ
k
n(ϕ) for j ≤ n.
For the (⊆) direction one has to apply necessitation and MP under the box
twice, for j and n, and use the fact that for some l,
Qln(ϕ) ⊢ 〈j〉T+ϕ〈n〉T+ϕ〈j〉T+ϕ〈n〉T+ϕQ
k
n(ϕ).
Corollary 2. Let T be a Πn+2 extension of EA and ϕ be any arithmetic for-
mula, then:
T+ 〈n+ 1〉Tϕ ≡Π0j+1 T+ {〈j〉T(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)) | i, k < ω}.
And as special case just in terms of worms we obviously have:
Corollary 3. Let T be a Πn+2 extension of EA and ϕ be any arithmetic for-
mula, then:
T+ 〈n+ 1〉T⊤ ≡Π0j+1 T+ {〈j〉T〈n〉
k
T⊤ | k < ω}.
4 An algebraic formulation
The reduction property theorem is formulated in the language of arithmetic. By
the Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington Theorem, for any Σ1-formula ϕ(x) one can
prove (in EA) that if T is consistent, this formula is equivalent to a formula
Tψ(x˙) for some ψ(x)
Theorem 5 (Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington). Let T be a recursively enu-
merable arithmetic theory1 and ϕ(x) ∈ Σ1, then there is a ψ(x) such that:
EA ⊢ ♦T⊤ →
(
Tψ(x˙)↔ ϕ(x)
)
1 This implies that it is elementary presentable, by Craig’s trick.
In [9] this theorem is generalized for n-provability, thus in a sense the arith-
metical Π0n+1 sentences are entirely captured by sentences of the form 〈n〉Tϕ.
Then it makes sense to ask if the reformulation of Theorem 1 holds in a purely
modal/algebraic setting. This question was answered in the affirmative in [3],
where Beklemishev proves that the Reduction Property hods in an algebraic
setting.
Definition 10 (Algebraic n-conservativity). Let τ, σ be sets of GLP formu-
lae. Then we say that σ and τ are n-conservative (we write τ ≡n σ) if, for all
formulae ϕ
τ ⊢GLP 〈n〉ϕ iff σ ⊢GLP 〈n〉ϕ.
With this notion of conservativity we can now formulate an algebraic pendant
of the reduction property.
Theorem 6 (Algebraic reduction property). Let ϕ, ψ be any modal formu-
lae, then:
〈n+ 1〉ϕ ≡n {Q
k
n(ϕ); k < ω}.
4.1 Πj+1-consequences: algebraic version
First, we prove the algebraic version of Proposition 6, that is, we characterize
exactly the Πj+1-consequences of 〈n+ 1〉ϕ for j ≤ n.
Observation 7 If A ≡n B and A ⊢ 〈n〉⊤, then A ≡j B, for j ≤ n.
Proof. Assume A ⊢ 〈j〉ϕ. Since A ≡n B and A ⊢ 〈n〉⊤, we have that B ⊢ 〈n〉⊤
and thus B ⊢ 〈j〉ϕ.
Theorem 8 (Πj-consequences). For j ≤ n < ω,
〈n+ 1〉ϕ ≡j {〈j〉(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); k < ω}
Proof. By induction on n− j.
Base case: j = n. By the algebraic version of the Reduction Property (The-
orem 6), we have that
〈n+ 1〉ϕ ≡n {Q
k
n(ϕ); k < ω} = {〈n〉(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); k < ω}.
Inductive Step: Now we assume that 〈n+1〉ϕ ≡j {〈j+1〉(ϕ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); k < ω}
(I.H.) and want to prove: 〈n+ 1〉ϕ ≡j {〈j〉(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); k < ω}.
For any k, by Reduction Property for j < n we have:
〈j + 1〉(ϕ ∧Qkn(ϕ)) ≡j {Q
i
j(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); i < ω}. (3)
This implies that
{〈j + 1〉(ϕ ∧Qkn(ϕ)); k < ω} ≡j {Q
i
j(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); i, k < ω}. (4)
To prove the main claim we assume that 〈n + 1〉ϕ ⊢GLPω 〈j〉ψ. By I.H. and
Observation 7 we get
{〈j + 1〉(ϕ ∧Qkn(ϕ)); k < ω} ⊢GLPω 〈j〉ϕ. (5)
By (4) from (5) we obtain
{Qij(ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); i, k < ω} ⊢GLPω 〈j〉ϕ. (6)
By an easy induction we can see that 〈j〉(ϕ ∧ Qi+kn (ϕ)) ⊢GLPω Q
i
j(ϕ ∧ Q
k
n(ϕ))
for any i and k. Thus we have that {〈j〉(ϕ ∧ Qkn(ϕ)); k < ω} ⊢GLPω {Q
i
j(ϕ ∧
Qkn(ϕ)); i, k < ω} and obtain the conclusion: {〈j〉(ϕ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)); k < ω} ⊢GLPω 〈j〉ϕ.
Corollary 4. For 0 ≤ j ≤ n, {〈j〉〈n〉k⊤ | k < ω} ≡j 〈n+ 1〉⊤
4.2 Reduction property in transfinite setting
When generalizing reduction property to transfinite setting, it is useful to define
a more general version of the Q-formulae.
Definition 11. Let ϕ by any formula, then by induction on the length of the
worm define:
Q(⊤, ϕ) = ⊤
Q(〈γ〉A,ϕ) = 〈γ〉(ϕ ∧Q(A,ϕ))
The next lemma tells us that many important properties of these generalized
Q-formulae actually resides in the worms involved.
Lemma 2. Let A,B ∈W and ϕ a GLPΛ formula, then
A ⊢ B ⇒ Q(A,ϕ) ⊢ Q(B,ϕ)
Proof. For any GLP formulas ψ and χ, we denote by ψχ the formula that is
obtained by replacing each subformula from ψ of the form [ξ]ψ′ by [ξ](χ→ ψ′).
By induction on the length of a GLP proof it is easy to see that if ψ is provable,
then so is ψχ. Then the lemma follows, since Q(A,ϕ) = Aϕ.
Since for limit ordinals we cannot talk of a predecessor, we need something
similar to that as captured in the notion of cofinality.
Definition 12 (Cofinal set of worms). Let τ ⊆ Wγ and A ∈ Wγ . Then we
say that τ is <γ-cofinal in A if oγ(τ) = oγ(A).
The following definition allows us to speak of the set of ordinals that occur
in a formula.
Definition 13. If ϕ is a formula of GLPΛ then mod ϕ is the set of all ordinals
appearing in the modalities of ϕ.
In the following lemma, we recall that it is not the size of the ordinals that
matter, rather it is just their comparison to the other ordinals in the formula
that matters.
Lemma 3 (Demotion and promotion lemma). Given ϕ, ψ of GLPΛ, let
s : mod{ϕ ∧ ψ} → ω be a function that enumerates modalities of ϕ, ψ in the
increasing order and ψ the result of replacing all modalities 〈ζ〉 in ψ by 〈s(ζ)〉.
⊢GLPΛ ϕ→ ψ ⇒⊢GLPω ϕ→ ψ (Demotion)
⊢GLPω ϕ→ ψ ⊢GLPΛ ϕ→ ψ (Promotion)
Proof. See [4].
We are now ready to state and prove our transfinite generalization of the
Reduction Property.
Theorem 9. Let γ < ζ ∈ On and ϕ be any modal formula. If 〈γ〉τ ⊆ W<ζ is
<γ-cofinal in 〈ζ〉⊤, then
〈ζ〉ψ ≡γ Q(〈γ〉τ, ψ).
Proof. Since all the modalities in γτ are smaller than ζ, we observe that 〈ζ〉⊤ ⊢GLPΛ
〈γ〉τ (that is, for each formula χ from 〈γ〉τ we have that 〈ζ〉⊤ → χ is provable).
Consequently, by Lemma 2 we obtain that 〈ζ〉ψ ⊇ Q(〈γ〉τ, ψ) whence in partic-
ular 〈ζ〉ψ ⊇γ Q(〈γ〉τ, ψ)
So, let us now focus on the reverse inclusion. We thus need to show that for
arbitrary ϕ we have 〈ζ〉ψ ⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉ϕ⇒ Q(〈γ〉τ, ψ) ⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉ϕ.
We assume that 〈ζ〉ψ ⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉ϕ. By the Demotion Lemma we get
〈n+ 1〉ψ ⊢GLPω 〈j〉ϕ (7)
for some j ≤ n < ω. Proposition 4 (Πj -consequences) and (7) imply
{〈j〉(ψ ∧Qkn(ψ)) | k < ω}⊤ ⊢GLPω 〈j〉ϕ. (8)
From (8), by the Promotion Lemma we get
{〈γ〉(ψ ∧Qkθ(ψ)) | k < ω}⊤ ⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉ϕ (9)
with θ ∈ mod(〈γ〉ϕ ∧ ψ) being the biggest ordinal in 〈γ〉ϕ ∧ ψ smaller than ζ.
Then we are done, once we show that Q(〈γ〉τ, ψ) ⊢GLPΛ Q
(
〈γ〉〈θ〉k⊤, ψ
)
for all
natural numbers k. By Lemma 2, we just need to show that 〈γ〉τ ⊢ 〈γ〉〈θ〉k⊤.
Since θ, γ < ζ, we have that for each k < ω, 〈γ〉〈θ〉k⊤ <γ 〈ζ〉⊤. Then, by
the <γ-cofinality of 〈γ〉τ in 〈ζ〉⊤ we get that 〈γ〉τ ⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉〈θ〉
k⊤. Therefore,
Q(〈γ〉τ, ψ) ⊢ 〈γ〉ϕ and this concludes the proof.
5 Appendix
Theorem 4. Let T be an elementary presented theory containing EA, and let
U be any Πn+2-extension of EA. Then U + RFNΣn+1(T) is Πj+1-conservative
over U +Πj+1-RR
jn(T).
Proof. By adapting the proof of Theorem 1 from [2]. Consider a cut-free proof
of a sequent Γ of the form:
¬U,¬RFNΣn+1(T), Π (10)
where ¬U and ¬RFNΣn+1(T) are finite subsets of negations of axioms of U and
of refletion principles, and Π ⊆ Πj+1. Let Γ
− be the result of deleting from
Γ all subformulae of ¬U and the subformulae of ¬RFNΣn+1(T) of complexity
bigger than Πn+1.
We show that if there is a cut-free proof of Γ , then U+Πj+1-RR
jn(T) ⊢
∨
Γ−.
The proof is by induction on the height of a derivation of Γ . Here we describe
the main step in which the proof differs from our case, for more details see [2].
Assume that the derivation is of the form
PrfT(t, p¬ϕ(s˙)q), ∆ ϕ(s), ∆
∧-I
PrfT(t, p¬ϕ(s˙)q) ∧ ϕ(s), ∆
By induction hypothesis, we have a derivation in U +Πj+1-RR
jn(T) of
ϕ(s) ∨
∨
∆− (11)
and
PrfT(t, p¬ϕ(s˙)q) ∨
∨
∆− (12)
Then from (11) by Πj+1-RR
jn we get 〈j〉T〈n〉T
(
ϕ(s˙) ∨
∨
∆−
)
and by Lo¨b’s
conditions and provable Σj+1-completeness we derive
〈j〉T〈n〉Tϕ(s˙) ∨
∨
∆− (13)
From (12) we get T¬ϕ(s˙) ∨
∨
∆− by ∃-introduction, which implies
[j]T[n]T¬ϕ(s˙) ∨
∨
∆− (14)
Then by cut from (13) and (14) we get
∨
∆−, which concludes the proof of this
case.
Lemma 2. Let Λ be an ordinal, γ > ζ ∈ Λ and ϕ, ψ are GLPΛ formulae,
then:
⊢GLPΛ 〈γ〉(ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ)↔ (〈γ〉ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ)
Proof. (→) Follows by monotonicity and transitivity and the fact that ⊢GLPΛ
〈n〉(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ 〈n〉ϕ ∧ 〈n〉ψ:
〈γ〉(ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ)⇒ 〈γ〉ϕ ∧ 〈γ〉〈ζ〉ψ ⇒ 〈γ〉ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉〈ζ〉ψ ⇒ 〈γ〉ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ.
(←) By axiom 〈ζ〉ψ → [γ]〈ζ〉ψ we have that 〈γ〉ϕ∧〈ζ〉ψ ⇒ 〈γ〉ϕ∧ [γ]〈ζ〉ψ ⇒
〈γ〉(ϕ ∧ 〈ζ〉ψ).
Lemma 5. For A,B ⊆Wγ , oγ(A) < oγ(B) ⇐⇒ A <γ B.
Proof. Applying lemmas from Section 4 of [5].
oγ(A) < oγ(B) ⇐⇒ o(γ ↓ A) > o(γ ↓ B) ⇐⇒
γ ↓ A > γ ↓ B ⇐⇒ γ ↑ (γ ↓ B) <γ γ ↑ (γ ↓ A)
⇐⇒ B <γ A
Proposition 7. (EA+〈n+1〉EA⊤)+RR
n(EA) 6≡ (EA+〈n+1〉EA⊤)+Πn+1-RR
n(EA).
Proof. Assume that
(EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + RR
n(EA) ≡ (EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) +Πn+1-RR
n(EA).
By the reduction property we have that
(EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + RR
n(EA) ≡Πn+1 (EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + RFNΣn+1(EA)
and by Proposition 1
(EA+ 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + RR
n(EA) ≡Πn+1 (EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤
Hence we have that (EA+ 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + RR
n(EA) ≡Πn+1 (EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤).
But now, since
(EA+ 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤) + RR
n(EA) ⊢ 〈n〉EA〈n+ 1〉EA⊤
we arrive at a contradiction:
EA + 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤ ⊢ 〈n〉EA+〈n+1〉EA⊤⊤.
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